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Abstract —Security policies are one of the most fundamental elements of computer security. Their design has to cope with composition of
components in security systems and interactions between them. Consequently, a modular approach for specification and verification of security
policies is necessary and the composition of modules must consistently ensure fundamental properties of security policies, in a rigorous and
systematic way. This paper shows how to use extended Petri net process (EPNP) to specify and verify security policies in a modular way.
It defines a few fundamental policy properties, namely completeness, termination, consistency and confluence, in Petri net terminology and
relates them to classical notions. According to XACML combiners and to property preserving Petri net process algebra (PPPA), several
policy composition operators are specified and property preserving results are stated for the policy correctness verification. The approach is
illustrated on the design of a complex policy.
Index Terms —security policy, extended Petri net, specification and verification, property preservation.
✦
1 I
In our information age, the world’s economy, communications,
entertainment etc. depend on computers which are often con-
nected by networks. Through networks, inestimably valuable
information is transmitted, and hence security policies are
required to protect the data (or other resources) from being
processed by any undesirable users (subjects). Consequently,
how to design highly dependable security policies that ensure
secure access to distributed resources is an urgent problem.
As far as policy design is concerned, the following two
requirements for a policy are the main source of difficulty and
complexity:
• Handling resources sharing and cooperation among het-
erogeneous systems: a local policy is designed for han-
dling a local request in a local system. A local system usu-
ally includes some private resources. In general, however,
users’ requests for services may be of very diversified
nature, it is hardly feasible for a single local system to
be able to contain enough resource information for sup-
porting all kinds of services. A system should be capable
of coordinating various resources and cooperating with
other systems. Consequently, the global policy should be
newly designed for handling the resources sharing and the
cooperation among heterogeneous systems. This induces
the difficult resource-sharing problem into the design of
access control policies.
• Component-based architecture: the policies and resources
of a system may be modeled, built or owned by different
This work was supported in part by National Natural Science Foundation of
China with Grant No. 10701030 and by INRIA.
unrelated parties, at different times, and under different
environments. Hence, in order to avoid severe interference
in their individual developments, it is better for a policy
to adopt a component-based architecture. In such an
architecture, the policy is considered as loosely-coupled
subpolicies. To build a complex global policy, they are
integrated via various composition operators.
In recent years, research and development in policies were
mainly around the two features mentioned above.
In a large system, there are many classes of subjects with
different needs for processing a variety of resources. Different
subjects usually have different (even competing) requirements
on the use of resources and their security goals (confiden-
tiality, availability, integrity) may be distinct. Hence, various
access requirements have to be consistently authorized and
maintained in a single policy. In this setting, the theory of
security policy composition becomes crucially significant. The
idea is similar to the component-based design in software
engineering. That is, each simple and original module is firstly
specified independently, then based on the control flow of the
system or on policy requirements, the modules are composed
into a whole system model. The objective is to deduce the
properties of the whole system, based on the properties of
the sub-modules, according to some theoretical results about
property preservation (i.e., the overall policy preserves the
properties of the constituent sub-policies).
A question that arises in composing policies is conflict
resolution. The idea of disambiguating among possibly con-
flicting decisions appear in several works, such as in [1],
[2] and is the core of the industrial standard access-control
language XACML [3]. However, XACML combiners are in
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fact not sufficient when the decision conflicts cannot be solved
based on the sub-policies decisions but on the activities of
the subjects or the systems. For instance, in the context of
preventing the conflict of interest between clients of competing
companies, this is the case for the Chinese Wall policy, whose
basic idea is that people are only allowed access to information
which is not held to conflict with any other information that
they already possess.
To address the safe composition problem, we introduce in
this paper a systematic and formal methodology to model
security policies and to verify whether required policy proper-
ties are preserved under composition of the sub-policies. The
results presented in this paper are, up to the best of our knowl-
edge, among the first efforts on systematic composition and
analysis of security policies with Petri nets in the literature.
Petri nets are well-known for their graphical and analytical
capabilities for the specification and verification of concurrent
and distributed systems. Moreover, they have two main fea-
tures particularly convenient for our methodology of modular
security policy design.
1) Petri net representations are analytical and flexible.
Analysis and logical reasoning can be performed on
their representations and on their properties. They are
compatible with a compositional approach via operators
for compositions, refinements and reductions, and their
functional purposes and characteristics are accurately
and logically reflected.
2) Many Petri net-based techniques are available for ver-
ification, including reachability analysis or mathemat-
ical programming, as well as for characterization and
transformations (see [4], [5] for a review.). There are
also abundant results concerning property preserving
operators.
Motivated by these advantages, several works about ap-
plying Petri nets to the policy design have appeared in the
literature (Section 2 gives a brief review). The common charac-
teristic of these approaches is that for a specific security policy,
Petri nets are used for the specification, and the reachability-
tree related techniques and CPN Tool are applied for the
verification. However it is well-known that these techniques
face a state explosion problem when the system is large and
complex. In order to overcome this shortage and to strengthen
the advantages of the Petri net formalism both in security
policy and on software engineering areas, this paper presents
some pioneer work about applying Petri nets for the security
policy design specification and verification in a modular way.
It provides the following contributions:
1) It introduces a newly defined model for the modular
specification, i.e., Extended Petri net Process (EPNP),
which are special Petri nets with a single entry place
and a single exit place working as the module interfaces.
In EPNP, colors are assigned to tokens and weights to
distinguish different types of data and reduce the state
space, time constraints are added to the transitions for
specifying the duration of executing an operation.
2) It gives formal definitions for policy-related proper-
ties, namely, completeness, termination, consistency and
confluence. These properties, presented in [6] in the
rewriting framework, are here adapted to the Petri net
approach and given in Petri net terminology. Some
theoretical results concerning these properties are stated.
3) It specifies some policy composition operators based on
Petri nets. Thanks to PPPA (a technology in Petri net
theory applicable mainly for component-based system
design in software engineering), eight simple composi-
tion operators based on EPNP are specified in order to
give some hints on applying PPPA to the security policy
design. The composition operators in PPPA are mainly
useful for those policies that solves conflicts through
system actions.
4) In order to solve conflicts in decisions obtained when
policies are combined, according to XACML, it specifies
four composition combiners to solve decision conflicts
according to predefined rules.
5) For each composition operator, the preservation of policy
properties is studied. This paper is the first one to
specify security policy with EPNP and verify the policy
properties based on the proof of property preservation,
which is one of the most popular verification techniques
in software engineering.
Our methodology of modeling and verification of security
policy is highly flexible and scalable. It is flexible because
any module (no matter whether or not it is obtained by
composition of other sub-modules) can be safely replaced with
an alternative design without reanalysis of the overall system
architecture. Since each module is designed as a correct EPNP
with a specific architecture, the replacement has the same
interface and satisfies the same constraints. This feature is
especially useful when we design different security policies
with the same EPNP architectures (see the specification of
the Bank COI in Chinese wall policy in Section 7.1 for
example). It is scalable because it allows us to analyze overall
composition without the interference of internal details of the
module design. Verification is done separately by checking
whether each sub-module satisfies the constraints of property
preservation. This significantly reduces the complexity. Fur-
thermore, our methodology is general and can be applied to a
large range of security policies design.
The paper is organized as follows: after giving some re-
lated works in Section 2, Section 3 reminds some basic
terminology about Petri nets and the definition of extended
Petri net process; Section 4 provides the formal definition of
policy properties with Petri net terminology, and some related
results concerning the policy properties are given. Section 5
is about the modular security policy design technology with
a property preserving approach. Eight composition operators
based on EPNP are defined and studied. Then in Section 6,
XACML combiners are specified with EPNP. For each com-
biner, property preservation results are presented. In Sections 7
a large scale complex policy design is illustrated based on
the methodology mentioned in the previous sections. Some
conclusive remarks are given in Section 8.
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2 RW
While there is a huge literature in systems engineering on
the key idea that complex systems are built by assembling
components, considering security policies as components and
studying their composition is a relatively recent research trend.
Policy composition is addressed in [7] through an algebra of
composition operators that is able to define union, intersection,
policy templates, among other operations. The work presented
in [8] extended this algebra with negative authorizations and
non-determinism and also includes an operator for sequential
composition. Another alternative for composing access control
policies is implemented by the Polymer system [9]. A different
approach to composition is taken in [10] for composing policy
specifications for web-services security. In [11], the author
proposes a set of high-level composition operators coherent
with a four-valued logic for policies.
In recent years, term rewriting theory has been applied
for the specification and verification of security policy de-
sign [6], [12], [13] and composition of security policy is
addressed in [6], [14]. In a rewrite-based specification, policies
are expressed by rules close to natural language: if some
conditions are satisfied, then, a given request is evaluated into
a decision, for instance it may be granted or denied. This
expressivity allows one to finely specify the conditions under
which decision takes place and these conditions may involve
attributes related to subjects or resources. Moreover strategic
rewriting is used to express control on the rules and to handle
priorities or choices between possible decisions. For instance
the specification of XACML combiners is given in [6], [14]
in the rewriting context.
Using Petri nets for the specification and verification of
the security policy design is not a new story. In [15], a
colored Petri-net based framework is presented for verifying
the consistency of RBAC policies. The reachability analysis
technique is applied for RBAC policy verification. In [16],
CPN is used to specify a real industrial example, namely
an access control system developed by the Danish security
company Dalcotech A/S. Based on the CPN model, the De-
sign/CPN tool is applied for the implementation of automatic
code generation. [17] defines task based access control as
a dynamic workflow and then specifies the workflow with
Petri nets. [18] and [19] model Chinese wall policy and Strict
Integrity Policy, respectively, with CPN and apply coverability
graph for the verification. [20] uses CPN for the specification
of mandatory access control policies and occurrence graph
is applied for verification. [21] applies Predicate/Transition
net for the modeling and analysis of software security system
architectures.
3 E P N P
In this paper, we assume some familiarity with basic notions
on Petri nets, briefly introduced here. More terminology and
fundamentals on Petri net theory can be found in [4], [22].
Definition 1 (Petri nets):A Petri net (N,M0) is a netN =
(P,T, F,W) with an initial markingM0 where,
• P is a finite set of places of cardinality|P|;
• T is a finite set of transitions such thatP ∩ T = φ, and
P∪ T , φ ;
• F ⊆ (P× T) ∪ (T × P) is the flow relation;
• W is a weight function such thatW(x, y) ∈ N+ if ( x, y) ∈
F andW(x, y) = 0 if (x, y) < F. For anyX,Y ⊆ P∪T, we
denoteW(X,Y) = {W(x, y) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, (x, y) ∈ F};
• M0 is a functionM : P→ N such thatM(p) represents
the number of tokens in placep ∈ P.
Definition 2 (firing rule): A transition t ∈ T is firable (or
enabled) at a markingM if and only if ∀p ∈ P : (M(p) >
W(p, t)). Firing (or executing) transitiont results in changing
marking M to markingM′, where∀p ∈ P : (M′(p) = M(p) −
W(p, t) +W(t, p)).
Definition 3 (pre-set, post-set, input set and output set):
For x ∈ P ∪ T, •x = {y|(y, x) ∈ F} and x• = {y|(x, y) ∈ F}
are called the pre-set (input set) and post-set (output set)
of x, respectively. For a setX ⊆ P ∪ T, •X = ∪x∈X•x and
X• = ∪x∈Xx•.
Definition 4 (incidence matrix):The pre-incidence matrix
PRE of a netN is a |P| × |T | matrix whose element at row
p and columnt is the weightW(p, t) of the arc from place
p to transitiont. The post-incidence matrix POST ofN is a
|P| × |T | matrix whose element is the weightW(t, p) of the arc
from transitiont to placep. V = POS T− PRE is called the
incidence matrix ofN.
Definition 5 (state equation and firing count vector):For
a Petri net (N,M0),M = M0+Vµ , is called the state equation,
whereV is the incidence matrix ofN andµ ∈ NT is the firing
count vector of a firing sequenceσ, i.e., µ[t] is the number
of times transitiont occurs inσ .
Any reachable markingM satisfies the state equation [22].
In other words, if the state equation is not true, then the
corresponding markingM is not reachable.
Definition 6 (Extended Petri nets):An extended Petri net
EPN= (N,M0,C, τ) is a Petri net with a color setC assigned
to the tokens in the places and the weight on the arc and a
time setτ assigned to the transitions.
Usually, colors in the EPN are used to distinguish different
types of data while time constraints are used to specify the
duration of executing an operation. In an EPN, the marking
and the weight are denoted as multiple dimension vectors.
A transition t ∈ T is firable (or enabled) at a markingM
if and only if ∀p ∈ P : M(p) ≥ W(p, t), where bothM(p)
andW(p, t) are |C|-dimensional vectors. Firing (or executing)
transition t results in changing markingM to marking M′,
where∀p ∈ P : (M′(p) = M(p) −W(p, t) +W(t, p)).
For denoting a marking of EPN, we have different expres-
sions that may be used interchangeably throughout the paper:
• a vector expression: e.g., for an EPNP with two colors
c1, c2, a marking with three places, for instanceM =
((2,1), (0,0), (1,1)), meaning that there are two tokens
with color c1, one token with colorc2 in place p1, no
tokens in placep2 and two tokens with colorc1 and c2
respectively in placep3;
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• a multi-set expression: e.g., for the above marking, we
denote M = {2c1, c2}p1 + {c1, c2}p3. Correspondingly,
sometimes we use just a color set to denote the marking
in a place. e.g.,M(p1) = {2c1, c2}, and the number of
tokens in placep1 is |M(p1)| = 3;
• the mix of vector and multi-set expression; e.g., for the
above markingM and a new placep4 with one token,
we may useM + p4 to denote another marking which
includes four places.
Definition 7 (firing sequence and reachability):Let M,M′
be markings,t be a transition, andσ be a transition sequence
in a Petri net (N,M0). M[N, σ〉M′ means thatM′ is reachable
from M by firing σ. M[N, ∗〉M′ means thatM′ is reachable
from M by firing an unspecified sequence.R(N,M) denotes
the reachability set ofN starting fromM, i.e., the smallest set
of markings such that: (a)M ∈ R(N,M); (b) If M′ ∈ R(N,M)
and M′[N, t〉M′′ for somet ∈ T, then M′′ ∈ R(N,M).
For example, in the EPN shown in Fig.1, initially, there
are two types of colored tokens< 1 > and < 2 > in place
p1, the initial marking isM0 = ((2,2), (0,0), (0,0), (0,0)) (or
M0 = ((2,2),0,0,0) for simplicity). Both t1 and t2 are firable,
after firing t1 for 3 units of time, a reachable markingM1 =
((1,1), (1,0),0,0).
(1,1)
p1
t1
p2
(1,0)
t2
t3
(1,0) (1,0)
(1,0) (1,0)
p3
p4
(1,1)
3
2<1>
2<2>
(1,1)
p1
t1
p2
(1,0)
t2
t3
(1,0)
(1,0) (1,0)
p3
p4
(1,1)
3
<1>
<2>
<1>
Fig. 1. An extended Petri net example.
Definition 8 (Extended Petri Net Process (Fig.7)):An ex-
tended Petri Net Process (EPNP)B = (EPN, pe, px) is an
extended Petri net EPN with an additional unique entry place
pe and unique exit placepx, where the placepe (resp.px) has
no input (resp. output) transitions.
When the security policy is specified with an EPNP, the
entry place pe represents the request, while the exit place
px represents the decision. Different requests and different
decisions are distinguished with different colored tokens. At
the same time, the entry place and exit place are designed as
two interfaces of the process. The initial marking of an EPNP
is denoted asMe = M0+ pe, the exit marking isMx = M+ px,
whereM is a marking in the internal EPN.
In the remaining part of this section, let us emphasize and
discuss several features of Extended Petri Net Processes.
1) Uniqueness of the entry place and exit place: by defini-
tion, an EPNP has only one entry place and one exit
place. This uniqueness assumption is mainly for the
EPN
pe
px
EPN
pe
px
B Ba
t
Fig. 2. An EPNP and its associated net.
consistency in modeling and convenience in creating
composite processes under the various operators. For
modeling real-life problems, the case of multiple entries
(resp., exits) can be easily converted to the case of single
entry (resp., exit) by creating a super entry (resp., exit)
place and controlling the firing of its output (resp., input)
places.
2) Role of the exit placepx: in a Petri net model like EPNP,
px is simply a sink place, indicating the location where
the control flow may leave the process after one cycle
of executions.
3) M0 represents a token distribution assigned to the set
of places P before execution of the EPNPB starts.
Those places having tokens serve controlling purposes.
For example, they may represent some system resources
that are available beforeB starts its execution. The asso-
ciation of a static markingM0 with B, whereM0 , 0, is
a special feature of EPNP. It greatly enlarges the scope
of application of EPNP.
4) Proper Initiation: it is not guaranteed that (B,Me) can
always be initiated. However, ifB can ever start firing,
it must start atMe and not at any other marking.
5) Deadness of Static Marking: together with the previous
condition, this feature implies that given a static mark-
ing, a process can only be initiated as follows:
• A process can start execution only after some tokens
have been deposited into its entry placepe.
• Without this deposit of tokens, (B,M0) cannot ‘self-
start’. This reflects the realistic requirement that a
process cannot start by itself. In order to start, it
must be called by another process or by itself (i.e.
recursively).
Since an EPNP is not strongly connected, it cannot satisfy
those important system properties such as liveness, reversibil-
ity and so on. However, they can be recovered by considering
the associated net of an EPNPB, that is a net with an
additional transitiont and two arcs (px, t) and (t, pe) in B
(Fig. 2). An EPNP is called almost live (respectively, bound,
reversible, etc) if its associated net is live (respectively, bound,
reversible, etc).
4 P N B P F S P
In our approach, security policies are build in a modular
way from basic modules, specified with extended Petri net
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processes. Accordingly, the policy properties are now defined
on EPNP.
4.1 Completeness
A security policy is decision complete (or simply complete) if
it computes at least one decision for every incoming request.
This property is called totality in [23] and [24].
Definition 9 (Completeness):Suppose a security policy is
specified with an EPNPB = (EPN, pe, px). The policy B is
complete if for any initial markingMe, there exists a marking
Mx = M + px which is reachable fromMe.
Based on the definition, an initial marking represents a
request, and the exit markingM + px is reachable, implying
that the policy will return a decision.
4.2 Termination
A security policy terminates if the evaluation of every incom-
ing request terminates.
Definition 10 (Termination):Suppose a security policy is
specified with an EPNPB = (EPN, pe, px). The policy B is
terminating (or strongly terminating) iff B has no infinite firing
sequences for any initial marking.B is said weakly terminating
iff for any initial marking, B has at least one finite firing
sequence. IfB terminates with an exit markingMx = M0+ px,
B is called properly terminating.
If B is weakly terminating, it may have infinite firing
sequence(s) but must terminate in some cases (see Fig. 3).
Strong termination requires that the policy always terminates
with a finite number of firing steps; while properly terminating
requires the policy to terminate (strongly or weakly) and
to reach a special exit state. More discussions on proper
termination are as follows:
px
t1
pe
t2
Fig. 3. An example of a weakly terminating policy.
• In general, proper termination by itself does not guarantee
that a process can always terminate. It just requires a pro-
cess to be at the exit stateMx = M0+px whenever a token
has been deposited intopx. Proper termination models the
well-known ‘memoryless’ property of a software process
that it should return to its initial ‘ready’ state after having
completed a cycle of execution.
• Together with the Deadness of Static Marking condition,
proper termination guarantees that no transition can be
fired when px gets a token. This follows from the fact,
wheneverpx gets a token, the system reaches a dead
marking becauseM0 in the internal EPN is dead.
• The Deadness of Static Marking condition, together with
the properties of Proper Initiation and proper termination,
guarantee that an EPNP is non-reenterable. This means
that, once having been initiated, an EPNP cannot be
initiated again until its previous execution cycle has been
completed. In general, to avoid mixing two independent
execution cycles of a Petri net process, one either has to
use colored Petri nets or control the procedure of entering
into the process.
The following results allow us to connect these policy
properties and the usual notions of boundedness, reversibility,
liveness and deadlock-freeness in Petri nets [22].
Proposition 1: Suppose a security policy is specified with
an EPNPB = (EPN, pe, px). The following properties are true:
1) If B is almost live,B is complete;
2) If B terminates properly,B is complete;
3) If B can terminate from any reachable marking and is
deadlock-free, thenB is complete;
4) If B is complete and almost bounded, then it is (strongly
or weakly) terminating.
5) If B is almost live and bounded, then it is terminating.
6) If B is almost live and reversible, then it is properly
terminating.
Proof:
1) If B is almost live, then for any initial markingMe
specifying a request, there exists a reachable marking
such that the transitiont ∈ •px is firable andMx = M+px
is reached after firing the transitiont.
2) If B terminates properly, thenMx = M0 + px is a
reachable marking and henceB is complete.
3) By contradiction. IfB is not complete, then there exists
a reachable marking such that eitherB cannot terminate
or it reaches a dead marking. This is in contradiction
with the assumption.
4) By contradiction. IfB cannot terminate, then either there
is a cycle orB has an infinite firing sequence. As a
result, either the tokens keep on transferring in the cycle
and B cannot be complete or the associated net ofB is
unbounded. This is in contradiction with the assumption.
5) If B is almost live, thenB is complete (based on property
1), and by property 4,B is terminating.
6) SinceB is almost live, by property 1,B is complete. That
is, Mx = M + px is reachable fromMe = M0+ pe. Since
B is almost reversible,M0+ px is reachable fromM+ px
in the associated netBa. HenceMx = M + px = M0+ px
in B and B is properly terminating.
4.3 Consistency
A security policy is consistent if it computes at most one
access decision for any given input request.
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Definition 11 (Consistency):Suppose a security policy is
specified with an EPNPB = (EPN, pe, px). Then the policy
B is consistent iff for any initial markingMe = M0 + pe, all
reachable markingsMi satisfy that|Mi(px)| ≤ 1 and for any
exit markingsM j and Mk, M j(px) = Mk(px).
Consistency implies that for any request, the policy returns
at most one decision. According to the above definition, all
reachable markings can have at most one token (|Mi(px)| ≤ 1)
with a unique identical color in placepx (since M j(px) =
Mk(px)). Note that when the EPNP does not terminate, the
decision placepx will not be marked, so the consistency
property is trivially satisfied.
The consistency property can be related to state equations in
Petri net theory. In a general Petri net (N,M0), any reachable
marking M satisfies the state equationM = M0 + Vµ, where
V is the incidence matrix andµ is the count vector of a firing
sequenceσ and M0[N, σ〉M (see Definition 5).
Proposition 2: Suppose a security policy is specified with
an EPNPB. Then,B is consistent if
• at most one of the following state equations is satisfied:
Mi = Me + Vµi , where|Mi(px)| = 1
• and no one of the following state equations is satisfied:
Mi = Me + Vµi , where|Mi(px)| > 1.
Proof: If the first state equations cannot be satisfied, then
the policy cannot make a decision. If at most one of first
state equations is satisfied, this implies that there may exist
a decision. If the second equation cannot be satisfied, this
implies that the case of more than two different decisions is
impossible.
Let us now relate consistency and the notion of confluence
defined for Petri nets.
4.4 Confluence
Definition 12 (Confluence):Suppose a security policy is
specified with an EPNPB = (EPN, pe, px). The policy B is
confluent iff for any initial markingMe = M0+pe and any two
reachable markingsMi ,M j ∈ R(B,Me), there exists a reachable
marking Mc in B such thatMc ∈ R(B,Mi) ∩ R(B,M j).
A home space ofB, denotedHS, is a set of markings,
such that for anyMi ,M j ∈ R(B,Me), there exists at least
one markingMc in HS reachable from bothMi and M j . If a
HS contains only one elementMc, then Mc is called a home
marking of B. In other words, a home marking is reachable
from any markingM ∈ R(B,Me).
The confluence property has been studied in the litera-
ture [25], [26], [27], [28]. It is proved to be a decidable prop-
erty in Petri net theory. For ordinary Petri nets (with weight 1
on each arc and no self-loop), the confluence can be reduced
to confluence of a 2-shallow term rewriting systems [27]. The
following Proposition is extracted from [27], [28] and the
detailed proof can be found in [28].
Proposition 3: Suppose a security policy is specified with
an EPNPB.
1) If a Petri net has a home marking then it is confluent.
2) A safe Petri net (i.e., a PN which satisfies that the
number of tokens in any place cannot exceed one for
any reachable marking) has a home marking iff it is
confluent.
3) Any confluent and strongly terminating Petri net has a
unique home marking.
Proposition 4: Suppose a security policy is specified with
an EPNPB. If B is consistent and proper terminating, thenB
is confluent and has a unique home marking.
Proof: SinceB is proper terminating and consistent, for
any request markingMe = M0 + pe there exists a unique exit
marking Mx = M0 + px reachable fromMe. From any two
reachable markingsMi and M j , one can reachMx. HenceB
is confluent andMx is the unique home marking.
5 M P C B  EPNP
In this section, our focus is on the composition of the security
policies in a modular way. In general, combining security
policies may result in inconsistent or non-terminating policies.
We explore which syntactic conditions and which operators
can guarantee the preservation of these suitable properties for
the composition of two policies.
PPPA is the abbreviation of Property preserving Petri net
Process Algebra [4], [5]. The algebra defines about twenty
operators based on PNP and considers the preservation of
about twenty system properties. The details of the formal
definition of these operators and the proof of the property
preservation results can be found in two PhD theses [4], [5].
In order to give some hints about how to apply PPPA
to the specification of security policies, we restrict our at-
tention in this paper to only four logic related composition
operators, namely Enable, Choice, Interleave and Disable, and
four application related compositions, namely place merging,
transition merging, place refinement and transition refinement,
and to the security-policy related properties, i.e., completeness,
termination, consistency and confluence. The application of
other operators follows similar ideas.
5.1 Logic based Operators for Composition
Definition 13 (Enable (Fig. 4)):For two processesBi =
(Pi ,Ti , Fi ,Wi ,Mi0,Ci ,Pie,Pix) (i = 1,2), their composition by
Enable, denotedB1 >> B2, is defined as the processB =
(P,T, F,W,M0,C, pe, px), whereP = P1 ∪ P2, pe = p1e, px =
p2x and p2e is merged withp1x; T = T1 ∪ T2; F = F1 ∪ F2;
W =W1 ∪W2; M0 = M10∪ M20; C = C1 ∪C2.
The Enable compositionB1 >> B2 models the sequential
execution of two processesB1 and B2. That is, B1 is first
executed andB2 is executed after the successful termination
of B1. However, ifB1 does not exit successfully,B2 will never
be activated.
Proposition 5: Let B be the policy obtained from two sub-
policies B1 and B2 by applying the composition operator
Enable. Then,
1) B is complete iff B1 and B2 are complete.
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2) B is strongly (resp., properly) terminating iff B1 and B2
are strongly (resp., properly) terminating;B is weakly
terminating iff B1 andB2 are weakly terminating, orB1
is complete andB2 is weakly terminating.
3) If both B1 and B2 are consistent, thenB is consistent.
4) If both B1 and B2 are confluent, thenB is confluent.
Proof: For each firing sequenceσ in B, it is either a
firing sequence inB1 or a union of a sequenceσ1 in B1
and a sequenceσ2 in B2, where M1e[B1, σ1〉M1x in B1. The
remaining part of the proof is trivial.
Definition 14 (Choice (Fig. 4)):For two processesBi =
(Pi ,Ti , Fi ,Wi ,Mi0,Ci , pie, pix) (i = 1,2), their composition
by Choice, denotedB1[] B2, is defined as the processB =
(P,T, F,W,M0,C, pe, px), whereP = P1 ∪ P2, pe is the place
merging p1e and p2e, px is the place mergingp1x and p2x;
T = T1 ∪ T2; F = F1 ∪ F2; W = W1 ∪W2; M0 = M10 ∪ M20;
C = C1 ∪C2.
The Choice compositionB1[] B2 models the arbitrary selec-
tion for execution between two processesB1 and B2.
Proposition 6: Let the policyB be obtained from two sub-
policies B1 and B2 by applying the composition operator
Choice. Then,
1) B is complete iff B1 and B2 are complete;
2) B is strongly (resp., weakly, properly) terminating iff B1
and B2 are strongly (resp., weakly, properly) terminat-
ing;
3) B is consistent ifB1 and B2 are consistent and output
the same colored token in the exit places;
4) B is not always confluent even if bothB1 and B2
are confluent.B is confluent if B1 and B2 are proper
terminating and output the same token in their exit place.
Proof: After applying Choice operator, the control flow
is within one of the sub-policies, so the first two properties
are trivial. For property 3, although bothB1 and B2 are
consistent, they may output different decisions. HenceB is
not always consistent unless bothB1 and B2 always output
the same colored token in their exit place. As for property
4, supposeMi ∈ R(Bi ,Mie), i = 1,2. Then Mi ∈ R(B,Me).
There is no reachable markingM ∈ R(B,M1)∩R(B,M2) except
M = Mx = M0 + px. Hence,B is not confluent unless bothB1
and B2 terminate properly and output the same colored token
in their exit place.
Definition 15 (Interleave (Fig. 5)):For two processes
Bi = (Pi ,Ti , Fi ,Wi ,Mi0,Ci ,Pie,Pix) (i = 1,2), their
composition by Interleave, denotedB1|||B2, is defined
as the processB = (P,T, F,W,M0,C, pe, px), where
P = P1 ∪ P2 ∪ {p1e, p2e}, pe, px are the newly added
entry place and exit place, respectively;T = T1 ∪ T2 ∪ {t0, tc},
where t0, tc are newly added transitions;F = F1 ∪ F2 ∪
{(pe, t0), (t0, p1e), (t0, p2e), (p1x, tc), (p2x, tc), (tc, px)}; W = W1 ∪
W2 ∪ {W((pe, t0),W(t0, p1e),W(t0, p2e),W(p1x, tc),W(p2x, tc),
W(tc, px)}, where W(tc, px) is a 2-dimension vector
(W(p1x, tc),W(p2x, tc)); M0 = M10∪ M20; C = C1 ∪C2.
The Interleave compositionB1|||B2 models the concurrent
but independent execution of two processesB1 and B2 with
synchronized exit.
pe= p1e
px = p2x
p1x= p2e
B1>>B2 B1[]B2
pe= p1e= p2e
px = p1x= p2x
EPN1 EPN2
EPN1
EPN2
Fig. 4. The operators Enable and Choice.
Proposition 7: Let the policyB be obtained from two sub-
policies B1 and B2 by applying the composition operator
Interleave. Then,
1) B is complete iff B1 and B2 are complete;
2) B is strongly (resp., properly) terminating iff B1 and B2
are strongly (resp., properly) terminating;B is weakly
terminating iff B1 and B2 are weakly terminating;
3) B is consistent iff B1 and B2 are consistent;
4) B is confluent iff B1 and B2 are confluent.
Proof:
1) B is complete iff transitiontc is firable, i.e., bothB1 and
B2 are complete.
2) SinceB1 andB2 are executed independently, each firing
sequence ofB is a union of sequences ofB1 and B2.
Property 2 follows easily.
3) If both B1 and B2 are consistent, for a request, the
outputs of each sub-policy are always the same, by
Definition 15, the output of transitiontc is unique and
B is consistent. On the other hand, ifB is consistent,
the token color (a 2-dimension vector) inpx is unique,
correspondingly, each entry of the 2-dimension vector is
unique, i.e., the token color in placesp1x andp2x should
be unique, implying bothB1 and B2 are consistent.
4) For any two reachable markingsMi = Pim + Qim in B,
wherePim,Qim are markings inB1 and B2 respectively
andi = 1,2, since bothB1 andB2 are confluent, there ex-
ist M′1 ∈ R(B1,P1m)∩R(B1,P2m) andM
′
2 ∈ R(B2,Q1m)∩
R(B2,Q2m). Then M = M′1 + M
′
2 ∈ R(B,M1) ∩ R(B,M2)
and B is confluent.
Definition 16 (Disable (Fig. 6)):For two processes
Bi = (Pi ,Ti , Fi ,Wi ,Mi0,Ci ,Pie,Pix) (i = 1,2), their
composition by Disable, denotedB1[> B2, is defined
as the processB = (P,T, F,W,M0,C, pe, px), where
P = P1 ∪ P2 ∪ {p1e, p2e}, pe, px are the newly added entry
place and exit place, respectively;T = T1 ∪ T2 ∪ {t0, tc}; F =
F1∪ F2∪ {(pe, t0), (t0, p1e), (t0, p2e), (p1x, tc), (p2x, tc), (tc, px)} ∪
{(Pd,Td), (Td, p2x)}, wherePd ⊆ P2,Td ⊆ T1; W = W1 ∪W2 ∪
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pe
EPN2
p2e
p2x
EPN1
p1e
p1x
px
to
tc
B1 ||| B2
Fig. 5. The opertor Interleave.
{W(pe, t0),W(t0, p1e),W(t0, p2e),W(p1x, tc),W(p2x, tc),W(tc, px)}
∪ {W(Pd,Td),W(Td, p2x)}, where W(tc, px) is a 2-dimension
vector (W(p1x, tc),W(p2x, tc)); M0 = M10∪ M20; C = C1 ∪C2.
The Disable composition is similar to Interleave. The dif-
ference is that there exist some placesPd in B2 which are
connected to some transitionsTd in B1 such that onceTd
are fired,B2 is dead and cannot output decisions normally.
According to the policy requirement, we may add an additional
arc (Td, p2x) for specifying the decisions of sub-policyB2 if
it is disabled.
B1 [> B2)
PdTd
pe
EPN2
p2e
p2x
EPN1
p1e
p1x
px
to
tc
Fig. 6. The operator Disable.
Proposition 8: Let the policyB be induced from two sub-
policies B1 and B2 by applying the composition operator
Disable. Then,
1) Suppose the transitions inTd are never fired inB. Then
the property preservation results are the same as those
for the Interleave operator in Proposition 7.
2) Suppose some transitions inTd are fired and all the
transitions inB2 are disabled inB. Then,
• B is complete ifB1 is complete;
• B is strongly terminating ifB1 is strongly termi-
nating; B is weakly terminating ifB1 is weakly
terminating;
• B is consistent ifB1 is consistent;
• B is confluent ifB1 is confluent.
3) If B1 andB2 are both complete (resp., terminating),B is
complete (resp., terminating), but in general confluence
and consistency are not preserved.
4) Suppose B2 satisfies the following conditions:
•(P•d) = {pd}, P
•
d =
•p2x, and W(Pd, •p2x) =
W(Pd,Td),W(•p2x, p2x) = W(Td, p2x). Then B is
consistent (resp., confluent) iff B1 andB2 are consistent
(resp., confluent).
Proof:
1) If Td are never fired inB, the operator is the same as
Interleave.
2) OnceTd are fired,B2 is dead and the remaining flow
is occurring inB1. Hence,B preserves the properties of
B1.
3) Since bothB1 and B2 are complete, after applying the
Disable operator, transitiontc is firable and henceB is
complete. Generally,Td may be fired or not. But in
both cases, the length of firing sequences inB cannot
exceed the sum length of two firing sequences selected
from B1 and B2, respectively. Hence,B preserves the
termination property. On the contrary, the consistency
and confluence properties cannot be preserved in gen-
eral: sinceTd may be fired,B may produce a decision
which is different from a decision ofB1. In that case
B is obviously not consistent. For a reachable marking
M in B, supposeTd is firable andM[B,Td〉(P1m+Q1m)
and M[B, ∗〉(P2m + Q2m), whereQ1m is a dead marking
in B2, while Q2m is a reachable marking inB2. Then,
there does not exist a reachable marking that belongs to
R(P1m+Q1m)∩R(P2m+Q2m). Hence,B is not confluent
in general.
4) When B2 satisfies the given conditions, the reachable
marking (i.e. the final decision) inB2, resulted from
firing transitions inP•d, is the same as that resulted from
firing Td. Hence, whether or notTd is fired, the reachable
marking states inB2 are the same. The remaining part
of the proof is similar to the proof for Proposition 7 and
omitted.
5.2 Policy Composition via Resources Sharing
In the context of cooperation between several independent
systems or entities, two or more security components have
to interoperate for accessing resources from the cooperating
domains. In this case, a global policy should be designed by
composing the local policies for sharing resources.
Example 1 (printer accessing policy (PAP)):Given two
domains D1 and D2, let us assume that each domain has
some resources (printers and xeroxing machines) for use.
The local policy for accessing resources is that once the
requested resources are available, the local user can access
them; after being used, the resources should be released. For
a global domainD composed fromD1 and D2, the resources
access policy is not changed, that is, each user can access any
resource once it is available and must release the resource
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after using. The difference of global policy and local policy
is that the set of resources is changed.
For EPNP specification, the policy composition is formally
defined as follows:
Definition 17 (place fusion (Fig. 7)):For two processes
Bi = (Pi ∪ R,Ti , Fi ,Wi ,Mi0,Ci , τi , pie, pix) (i = 1,2),
their composition by sharing resourcesR, where,
M10(R) = M20(R), denoted B1[R]B2, is defined as
the EPNP B = (P ∪ R,T, F,W,M0,C, τ, pe, px), where
P = P1 ∪ P2 ∪ {p1e, p2e, p1x, p2x}, pe and px are newly
added interface places;T = T1 ∪ T2 ∪ {te, tx}; F =
F1 ∪ F2 ∪ {(pe, te), (te, p1e), (te, p2e), (p1x, tx), (p2x, tx), (tx, px)};
W = W1 ∪ W2 ∪ {W(pe, te),W(te, p1e),W(te, p2e)} ∪
{W(p1x, tx),W(p2x, tx),W(tx, px)}; where W(tx, px) is a 2-
dimension vector (W(p1x, tx),W(p2x, tx)) M0 = M10 ∪ M20;
C = C1 ∪C2; τ = τ1 ∪ τ2 (τ(te) = τ(tx) = 0).
pe
EPN2
p2e
p2x
EPN1
p1e
p1x
R R
B1 B2
EPN2
p2e
p2x
EPN1
p1e
p1x
R
px
te
tx
B1[R]B2
Fig. 7. Policy composition via resource sharing
Based on the definition, place fusion operator is applicable
for two EPNPs with the same set of resource places for
sharing, i.e., they have the common resource placesR with
the same number of initially marked tokens. Hence, for policy
composition, the EPNP specification for each local policy may
need a modification before applying fusion operator. That is,
adding some new resource places (e.g., placer2 in Fig. 8(a)
is newly added) and modify the number of tokens for some
resource places (e.g., the number of tokens inr1 and r2 in
Fig. 8(b) are changed).
In order to illustrate the above definition, let us consider
Example 1. In each local domain, a user may request printing,
or copying, or printing and copying, or doing nothing. Based
on local policy, once the resource is available, the decision for
the request is permitted. Let us suppose that the domainD1
has one printer (r1) and no xeroxing machine, the domainD2
has one printer (r1) and one xeroxing machine (r2). The EPNP
based policy specification is shown in Fig. 8(a), where a user
from D1 can only successfully request printing (firingt51) or
doing nothing (firingt91). Neither copying nor “printing and
copying” is possible. In domainD2, a user can successfully
request printing (firingt52), or copying (firingt72), or printing
and copying (firingt12), or doing nothing (firingt92) once the
requested resource is available.
In this cooperation context, the global domain now has
two printers and one xeroxing machine for sharing. Hence,
Fig. 8(a) will be changed to Fig. 8(b) by modifying their
resource placesr1 and r2. At last, place fusion operator is
applied for policy composition and resulted in Fig. 8(c). The
specification of the places and transitions are explained in
Table 1.
Note that resource sharing may result in unsafe interop-
eration. For instance, in the above example, copying is not
permitted inD1 (transition t71 does not appear in Fig. 8(a))
but is permitted in the global domain (transitiont71 may be
enabled in Fig. 8(c)). However, whether or not to cooperate is
the manager’s business and it is out the scope of this paper.
Instead, this paper focuses on how to compose the policies and
assumes that adding new resources to a local policy is safe. For
example, in Example 1, the manager decides whether or not
to share resources (i.e., to transform Fig. 8(a) into Fig. 8(b)),
while our business is to consider how to specify sharing (i.e.,
to transform from Fig. 8(b) into Fig. 8(c)).
TABLE 1
Specification of Fig. 8
node specification
pe, px the interface places of global policy
pie, pix the interface places of local policies
p1i The state of printing and copying
p2i The state of finishing printing
p3i The state of finishing copying
p4i The state of printing
p5i The state of copying
r1 The resource place for printers
r2 The resource place for xeroxing machine
te, tx The interface transitions of the global policy
t1i request printers and xeroxing machines
t2i printing and copying (with time constraint)
t3i , t6i release printers and copying (with time constraint)
t4i , t8i release xeroxing machines
t5i request printers and printing (with time constraint)
t7i request xeroxing machines and copying (with time constraint)
t9i request nothing
Generally, composing two systems by place fusion may
result in system deadlocks [29], [30]. Deadlock occurs when
r sources are limited and users should compete for using them.
For handling deadlock issues based on Petri net models,
current research considers the following three types of ap-
proaches: the first one is relying on techniques concerning
siphons and traps. Elementary siphon invariants in Petri net
structures are useful for analyzing deadlock [31], [32], [33],
[34]. The deadlock-free method is addressed by adding a
monitor or controller to avoid deadlock structure [33], [34],
[29]. The second approach relies on a scheduling algorithm.
Heuristic scheduling algorithms, such as genetic algorithms,
are used to get an optimum and deadlock-free scheduling
of flexible manufacturing systems in [35], [36]. The third
approach is based on the notion of transitive matrix [37]. The
place transitive matrix describes the transferring relation from
one place to another place through transitions. The analysis
of the cyclic scheduling for the determination of the optimal
cycle time is studied, and the concept of transitive matrix
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p11
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p32
t42
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(a)
p1e
p1x
r1
t51
p41
t61
t91
D1
Fig. 8. EPNP-based specification for Example 1
has efficiently been used to slice off some subnets from the
original net in [30]. Deadlock-free conditions are given in [38],
[39] based on transitive matrix, and an algorithm for finding
deadlock is given in [40] using the theory of transitive matrix.
The above mentioned approaches can be applied for design-
ing a deadlock-free policy, and the deadlock-handling problem
is outside the scope of this paper, that mainly considers
deadlock-free policy composition. Accordingly, we specify a
deadlock free local policy as follows: let us suppose that a user
requests a resourcer1 for executing an operationt1. Before
releasingr1, the same user will request another resourcer2 for
executing another operationst2 (Fig. 9(a)). In this case, for the
Petri net specification, both resources will be occupied by the
user at the very beginning time of requestingr1 (Fig. 9(b)).
For instance, in the above example of policy composition,
for the request of “printing and copying”, in order to avoid
system deadlock, transitiont1i , i = 1,2 requests both printers
and xeroxing machines even if printing and copying are not
executed at the same time. We call such a way of requesting
resources “complete occupying”.
pe
t1
t2
p1
t3
p2
px
p3
t4
r1
r2
pe
t1
t2
p1
t3
(a)
px
p3
t4
r1
r2
p2
(b)
Fig. 9. Modification of sharing resources
With “complete occupying” in each local policy, each
resource will be requested orderly without circular waiting
and the composed system is deadlock free. However, the time
duration of handling a request may be delayed. For instance,
in the above printer accessing policy, let us assume that user
A from domainD1 requests printing and copying and user B
from domainD2 requests copying. Let us assume that there is
only one printer and one xeroxing machine and in the EPNP
specification, the time for printing is 10, for copying is 5, that
is, τ(t21) = τ(t51) = τ(t52) = 10, τ(t31) = τ(t71) = τ(t72) = 5,
and for firing other transitions is 0. Based on the global policy,
the minimum time for handling these two requests is 15, that
is, while user A is printing, user B can copy simultaneously.
However, in the “complete occupying” case, since both the
printer and the xeroxing machine are occupied by user A, user
B has to wait until user A releases the xeroxing machine. In
this case, the total time for handling the requests is 20.
Although “complete occupying” may delay the decision for
a request, it prevents a policy from the difficult deadlock-
handling problems. Searching for an optimal scheduling al-
gorithm for fastly handling a request is out of scope of this
paper.
Coming back to policy composition, we get the following
conclusions.
Proposition 9: Let us consider a global policyB = (P ∪
R,T, F,W,M0,C, τ, pe, px) composed from two local policies
Bi = (Pi∪R,Ti , Fi ,Wi ,Mi0,Ci , τi , pie, pix) (i = 1,2) by applying
place fusion with “complete occupying” resources. ThenB is
complete (resp., terminating, consistent, confluent) provided
both B1 and B2 are complete (resp., terminating, consistent,
11
confluent).
Proof: Since the resources are shared by “complete
occupying”, B1 and B2 are executed independently. Each
firing sequence ofB is a union of sequences ofB1 and B2.
Correspondingly, each reachable marking inB is a union of
reachable markings ofB1 andB2. The proof about preserving
policy properties is similar to Proposition 7.
5.3 Policy Composition via Operation Synchronization
Let us now consider another kind of composition through an
operation synchronization, first presented through an example.
Example 2 (writing accessing policy (WAP)):Let us con-
sider two local policies, each one designed for writing some
local documents. Each local policy is as follows: a specific user
requests writing a document. Once the document is available, it
can be written, then, after writing, the document is returned to
its place. In the context of cooperation, due to security reasons,
the global policy requires that some special documents in a
setD (such as contracts) cannot be signed unless two specific
users from different domains sign them together.
In this example, the global policy should be composed
from the two local policies by applying transition fusion.
It is formally defined as follows and, for understanding the
definition, the reader can refer to Fig. 7 where the common
resources set placeR has to be replaced by the common
transition setS.
Definition 18 (transition fusion):For two processesBi =
(Pi ,Ti ∪ S, Fi ,Wi ,Mi0,Ci , τi , pie, pix) (i = 1,2), their com-
position by operation synchronization (applying transition
fusion for S), denoted B1[S]B2, is defined as the pro-
cess B = (P,T ∪ S, F,W,M0,C, τ, pe, px), where P =
P1 ∪ P2 ∪ {p1e, p2e, p1x, p2x}, pe and px are newly added
interface places;T = T1 ∪ T2 ∪ S ∪ {te, tx}; F =
F1 ∪ F2 ∪ {(pe, te), (te, p1e), (te, p2e), (p1x, tx), (p2x, tx), (tx, px)};
W = W1 ∪ W2 ∪ {W(pe, te),W(te, p1e),W(te, p2e)} ∪
{W(p1x, tx),W(p2x, tx),W(tx, px)}; where W(tx, px) is a 2-
dimension vector (W(p1x, tx),W(p2x, tx)) M0 = M10 ∪ M20;
C = C1 ∪C2; τ(t) =
 τi(t), t ∈ Ti ;max{τi(t)}, t ∈ S.
To illustrate the definition of transition fusion, let us con-
sider the above Example 2. Fig. 10 gives the specification of
the two local policies, where transitiont1i requests a document
for processing; if some normal documents are requested,t2i
is fired for processing documents, if some special documents
that belong toD are requested,t2 is fired; after processing
document,t3i is fired for returning the documents (i = 1,2).
After policy composition, the global policy requires that the
normal documents are processed by local users, while for
processing the special documents inD, two specific users
from different domains should be both on the scene (on-line or
off-line) and execute the processing operation together. Hence
transitionst2 in both local policies should be fused into a single
transitiont2 in the global policy.
For policy composition via transition fusion, we have the
following results.
Proposition 10: Let us consider a global policyB = (P,T∪
S, F,W,M0,C, τ, pe, px) composed from two local policies
!"#
$""
$%"
!""
$&"
!%"
!"'
(" (%
!%#
$"%
$%%
!"%
$&%
!%%
!%'
)" )%
$% $% $%%
!"#
$""
$%
!""
$&"
!%"
!"'
(" (%
!%#
$"%
!"%
$&%
!%%
!%'
)"*+,)"
$#
!#
!'
$'
$%" $%%
$-& $--$-& $--
Fig. 10. Policy composition via transition fusion
Bi = (Pi ,Ti∪S, Fi ,Wi ,Mi0,Ci , τi , pie, pix) (i = 1,2) by applying
transition fusion. ThenB is complete (resp., terminating,
consistent, confluent) provided bothB1 and B2 are complete
(resp., terminating, consistent, confluent).
Proof: By transition fusion, the control flow in each local
policy remains unchanged except that the total time duration
of executing the policy is delayed. Each firing sequence ofB is
a union of sequences ofB1 andB2. The proof about preserving
policy properties is similar to Proposition 7.
5.4 Policy Refinement
For security requirement, sometimes an encapsulated policy
should be added to an existing policy. The former is named
a sub-policy, whereas the latter is named a super-policy. This
section discusses how to compose a sub-policy and a super-
policy by applying place refinement and transition refinement
based on EPNP specification.
The formal definition of composition via place refinement
is as follows.
Definition 19: (Fig. 11) For two processes
Bi = (Pi ,Ti , Fi ,Wi ,Mi0,Ci , τi , pie, pix) (i = 1,2), their
composition by applying place refinement for place
pr ∈ P1, denoted B1[pr 7→ B2], is defined as the
process B = (P,T, F,W,M0,C, τ, pe, px), where P =
P1∪P2∪{p2e, p2x}− {pr }, pe = p1e and px = p1x; T = T1∪T2;
F = F1 ∪ F2 ∪ {(•pr , p2e), (p2x, p•r )} − {(
•pr , pr ), (pr , p•r )};
W =W1∪W2∪W(•pr , p2e)∪W(p2x, p•r )−W(
•pr , pr )−W(pr , p•r );
M0 = (M10 − {M10(pr )}) ∪ M20 ∪ M0(p2e), where
M0(p2e) = M10(pr ); C = C1 ∪C2; τ = τ1 ∪ τ2.
Based on the above definition, a sub-policyB2 is inserted
into a super-policyB1 by refining placepr with B2. Those
input (resp., output) transitions ofpr in B1 become the input
(resp., output) transitions of placep2e (resp., p2x) in B. The
t kens ofpr in B1 move to placep2e in B. Other parts do not
change (Fig. 11).
In order to illustrate the application of place refinement for
policy composition, let us consider the following example.
Example 3 (document accessing policy):Let us assume
that there are two types of documents distinguished as local
document (L) and global document (D). The policy about
accessing a document is as follows: for requesting a local
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p2e
p2x
pr
B1
B2
B = B1 [pr !B2]
Fig. 11. Policy composition via place refinement
document, once the document is available, the request is
permitted. While for requesting a global document, for se-
curity reason, it should be decided by applying Chinese Wall
policy (CWP) whose detailed specification is introduced in
Section 7.1). Hence, as a sub-policy, the Chinese Wall policy
will be composed with the super-policy by applying the place
refinement operator, This example will be furthe detailled in
Section 7.
Let us now consider property preservation results for place
refinement.
Proposition 11: Let a global policy B =
(P,T, F,W,M0,C, τ, pe, px) be composed from two local
policies Bi = (Pi ,Ti , Fi ,Wi ,Mi0,Ci , τi , pie, pix) (i = 1,2), by
refining placepr ∈ P1 into B2.
1) If B1 is complete,B2 is complete and consistent, thenB
is complete;
2) If both B1 and B2 terminate, so doesB;
3) If both B1 and B2 are consistent, so isB;
4) If B1 is confluent andB2 terminates properly, thenB is
confluent.
Proof:
1) If B2 is complete and consistent,B2 will output an
identical token each time it is referred. Consequently,
the firing sequence inB1 part will remain unchange and
henceB is complete ifB1 is complete.
2) If B2 terminates,B2 may or may not output a token.
Correspondingly, inB, the transitions inp•r may or may
not be fired. As a result, each reachable state ofB is
a union of the states inB1 and B2. Obviously, B will
terminate ifB1 can terminate.
3) If B2 is consistent,B2 either always outputs an identical
token, or never outputs a token. In the first case, the
firing sequences inB1 part remain unchanged and hence
B is consistent. IfB2 never outputs a token, then the
transitions inp•2x are never fired inB. As a result, some
firing sequences inB1 part will never appear inB. But
those firing sequences that do not include any transition
of p•2x still exist in B. If B1 is consistent, the control
flow in B1 part will not be changed and henceB is still
consistent.
4) If B2 terminates properly,B2 will output a single token
and resume to its static stateM20 once it is referred.
Each reachable marking ofB is a union of the markings
of B1 and B2. For any two reachable markingsMi =
Pim + Qim in B, wherePim,Qim are markings inB1 and
B2 respectively andi = 1,2, sinceB1 is confluent and
B2 terminates properly, there existM′1 ∈ R(B1,P1m) ∩
R(B1,P2m) and M20 ∈ R(B2,Q1m) ∩ R(B2,Q2m). Then
M = M′1+M20 ∈ R(B,M1)∩R(B,M2) andB is confluent.
If an encapsulated policy is added by transition refinement,
we will modify the super-policy by splitting the refined
transition, and then place refinement operator can be applied
for policy composition. The formal definition of transition
splitting is defined as follows.
Definition 20: (Fig. 12) For a process B =
(P,T, F,W,M0,C, τ, pe, px), splitting transitiont ∈ T results
in the processB′ = (P′,T′, F′,W′,M′0,C
′, τ′, p′e, p
′
x), where
P′ = P∪ {p},T′ = (T − {t})∪ {t1, t2}; F′ = (F − {(•t, t), (t, t•)})∪
{(•t, t1), (t1, p), (p, t2), (t2, t•)}; W′ = (W − {W(•t, t),W(t, t•)}) ∪
{W(•t, t1),W(t1, p),W(p, t2),W(t2, t•)}; M′0 = M0; C
′ = C, τ′ =
τ, p′e = pe, p
′
x = px.
t
t1
t2
p
Fig. 12. Transition splitting
For transition refinement, it is easy to prove that the transi-
tion splitting operator preserves all the properties considered
in this paper. Hence, we get the following results. The proof
is the same as for Proposition 11.
Proposition 12: Let a global policy B =
(P,T, F,W,M0,C, τ, pe, px) be composed from two local
policies Bi = (Pi ,Ti , Fi ,Wi ,Mi0,Ci , τi , pie, pix) (i = 1,2), by
applying transition refinement for transitiont ∈ T1.
1) If B1 is complete,B2 is complete and consistent, thenB
is complete;
2) If both B1 and B2 terminate, so doesB;
3) If both B1 and B2 are consistent, so isB;
4) If both B1 and B2 are confluent, so isB.
Based on the composition operators defined in this section,
a large security policy system can be specified step by step by
composing its different modules. The previous propositions
help verifying properties of a large system composed with
these operators. However they have shown that the properties
of confluence and consistency are not always preserved in such
compositions. In the next section, we show how to restore in
most cases these properties by a further composition with new
EPNP closely related to XACML policy combiners.
6 EPNP-B S  XACML C
For a security system, in particular an access control system,
the same resource may be requested by different policies and
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their respective decisions may be different. This question has
been largely addressed and a common technique is to use
XACML policy combiners to solve the conflicts resulting from
applying different policies for the same resources. There are
four combiners described as follows:
• Permit-overrides:whenever one of the policies answers to
a request with a “Permit” decision, the final authorization
for the composed policy is “Permit”. The policy will
generate a “Deny” only in the case where at least one
of the sub-policies returns “Deny”, and all others return
“NotApplicable” or “Indeterminate”. When all sub-policy
return “NotApplicable”, the final output is “NotApplica-
ble”. The decision is “Indeterminate” if no sub-policy
returns a decision, i.e. when unexpected errors occur in
every evaluation attempt.
• Deny-overrides: the semantics are similar toPermit-
overrides. The only difference is to exchange “Permit”
and “Deny” in the above description.
• First-applicable:the final authorization coincides with the
result of the first sub-policy which produces the decision
“Permit” or “Deny”; if no sub-policy is applicable, then
the decision is “NotApplicable”; if errors occur, then it
is “Indeterminate”.
• Only-one-applicable:the resulting decision will be “Per-
mit” or “Deny” if the single policy that applies to the
request generates one of these decisions. The result will
be “NotApplicable” if all policies return such decision.
The result is “Indeterminate” if more than one policy set
returns a decision different from “NotApplicable”.
In order to simplify the specification model, we assume in
this paper that there are only two sub-policies and no error
occurs in the combiners, so there are only three possible
decisions, namely “Permit”, “Deny”, and “NotApplicable”.
Actually it would be not harder but only more technical
to handle multiple sub-policies and an additional decision
“Indeterminate”.
Let us first consider the formal specification of Permit-
overrides combiner based on extended Petri net processes.
The Petri net structure given in Fig. 13 is defined asPOC =
(p3e, p3x,Tc, Fc,Wc,Mc,Cc). Places p3e and p3x have three
types of tokens colored withp, d, n respectively, representing
the three different decisions. Weights are assigned to each arc.
For example, in Fig. 13, the weight of the arc (p3e, tpp) is
(2,0,0): this means that firing transitiontpp requires at least
two tokens colored withp, i.e., both sub-policies return the
decision “Permit”. After firing transitiontpp, the output is
(1,0,0), meaning that placep3x gets a token colored withp,
i.e., the final decision is “Permit”.
For the Deny-overrides combiner (DOC), the specification
is similar to the above defined Permit-overrides combiner, just
exchanging “Permit” and “Deny”,p andd.
The First-applicable combiner FAC =
({p4e, p4x},Tc, Fc,Wc,Mc,Cc) is defined in Fig. 14, where
the entry placep4e represents all possible decisions taken by
the sub-policies, while the exit placep4x represents the final
decision of the composed policy.Tc is the transition set: for
each transition, there is a firing condition assigned to it. For
example, the weight (1,0,1) means that the decisions of the
tpp tpd
tpn tdd tdn tnn
(2 0 0)
(1 1 0)
(1 0 1)
(0 2 0)(0 1 1)
(0 0 2)
(1 0 0)
(1 0 0) (1 0 0)
(0 1 0)
(0 1 0)
(0 0 1)
p3x
p3e
Fig. 13. Permit-overrides combiner POC.
sub-policy are “Permit” and “NotApplicable” respectively.
The conditionσp ≤ σn means that the firing sequence of
σp is shorter than the sequenceσn, so the first decision is
“Permit”. Note thatσp and σn are firing sequences of the
two sub-policies. Hence the final decision is made based
on not only the sub-policies’ decisions but also their firing
sequences.
(2 0 0)
pe
tpp
(0 2 0)
(0 0 2)
tdd
tnn
dp !! " dp !! # np !! " np !! # nd !! " nd !! #
(1 1 0)
(1 1 0)
(1 0 1)
(1 0 1)
(0 1 1)
(0 1 1)
(1 0 0)
(1 0 0) (1 0 0)
(0 1 0)
(0 1 0)
(0 1 0)
(0 0 1) (0 0 1)
(0 0 1)
px
Fig. 14. First-applicable combiner FAC.
For the only-one-applicable combiner, the extended Petri
net moduleOAC = ({p5e, p5x},Tc, Fc,Wc,Mc,Cc) is shown
in Fig. 15. It contains only two transitions: if there exists
only one possible decision of “Permit” (1,0,0) or “Deny”
(0,1,0) or there are two decisions of “NotApplicable” (0,0,2),
the transitiontd can be fired and the placep5x gets a same
colored token. Otherwise transitiontn is fired andp5x outputs
a decision “NotApplicable”.
Proposition 13: POC, DOC, FAC, OAC are EPNP which
are complete, strongly terminating, consistent and confluent.
Proof: For each of POC, DOC, FAC and OAC, there are
only two reachable markings, one is the initial marking and
the other is the exit marking. All the firing sequences contains
only one transition inTc. It is obvious that they are complete,
strongly terminating, consistent and confluent.
As a consequence of Propositions 5 and 13, ifB is complete,
strongly terminating, consistent and confluent, and ifCOM is
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(0 0 1)
p3x
p3e
)}002(),010(),100{(!x
x
)}002(),010(),100{("x
td
Fig. 15. Only-one-applicable combiner OAC.
one of POC, DOC, FAC, OAC,B >> COM will enjoy the
same properties.
Moreover, whenB is itself built from other modules using
composition operators [], |||, [>, but is not confluent or not
consistent, one of the previous combiner can be used to restore
these properties.
Proposition 14: SupposeB is composed fromB1 and B2
by applying one of Choice, Interleave and Disable operators
andCOM is any one of the combiners POC, DOC, OAC and
FAC.
1) B >> COM is complete, strongly terminating ifB1 and
B2 enjoy these two properties.
2) Let B = B1[] B2. B >> COM is consistent ifB1 and B2
always output the same tokens;B >> COM is confluent
if both B1 and B2 terminate properly.
3) Let B = B1|||B2 and COM ∈ {POC,DOC,OAC}. Then
B >> COM is consistent and confluent ifB1 and B2
enjoy these properties.
If B = B1|||B2 and COM = FAC, then B >> COM is
confluent.B >> COM is consistent provided that for all
reachable markingsM1,M2 that satisfyM10[B1, σ1〉M1,
M20[B2, σ2〉M2, M1(p1x) > 0, M2(p2x) > 0, we always
have eitherσ1 ≤ σ2 or σ2 ≤ σ1.
4) Let B = B1[> B2, then B >> COM is consistent pro-
vided that 1) COM= FAC; 2) B1 is consistent and for all
reachable markingsM1,M2 that satisfyM10[B1, σ1〉M1,
M20[B2, σ2〉M2, M1(p1x) > 0, M2(p2x) > 0, we always
have eitherσ1 ≤ σ2 or σ2 ≤ σ1.
B >> COM is confluent if B1 and B2 are confluent
and satisfy•(P•d) = {pd}, P
•
d =
•p2x, andW(Pd, •p2x) =
W(Pd,Td),W(•p2x, p2x) =W(Td, p2x).
Proof:
1) By Propositions 6, 7 and 8,B preserves these two
properties. By Propositions 5 and 13,B >> COM also
preserves these two properties.
2) If B = B1[] B2, whenB1 andB2 output the same tokens,
then the input ofCOM is the same and hence the
final decision is consistent. If bothB1 and B2 terminate
properly, for any two reachable markings, they will reach
the exit marking ofB >> COM and henceB >> COM
is confluent.
3) If B = B1|||B2, since bothB1 andB2 are consistent, their
output is always the same and hence the input for the
entry place ofCOM is always the same, andCOM is
consistent by Proposition 13. By Propositions 5 and 7,
B >> COM is confluent.
4) If B = B1[> B2 and the condition is satisfied, then
the final decision is the same as that ofB1 and hence
consistent. Based on Propositions 5, 8 and 13,B is
confluent and so isB >> COM.
7 A C P D—  
Let us consider a situation where a user requests access to
documents belonging to different competitive companies. Such
access is granted or denied on the basis on a Chinese Wall
Policy [41]; if the user has a reading access to a document,
he may print it and/or copy it. If he has a writing access, he
may modify it for instance by signing the document.
The information flow is as follows: a user requests “reading”
or “writing” a document according to the Chinese Wall Policy
(CWP); in the first case, once the access decision for reading
is obtained, the user can continue processing the document by
applying the “printer accessing policy” (PAP); in the second
case, once the access decision for writing is obtained, the user
can process the document by applying the “writing access
policy” (WAP).
For cooperation, the two domains are combined. Their
printers and xeroxing machines are shared by users from both
domains. Generally, their local documents can be handled
based on their local security policies. But let us assume that
some special documents, in a setD, can be processed only if
specific users from both domains handle them together.
Based on our approach, a policy design has the following
three steps: specification of primitive modules; composition
of sub-policies; and verification of policy correctness. In
the following subsections, we introduce the specification and
verification of both local and global policies.
7.1 Specification of primitive modules
The principles of sub-policies PAP and WAP have been
described in Section 5.2, and Section 5.3 respectively. The
Petri net based specifications of these policy modules are
shown in Figure 8 and Figure 10 respectively. We concentrate
in the following on the description of CWP.
Chinese wall policy is about preventing the conflict of
interest between clients. Figure 16 is an example of context
where application of the Chinese Wall policy [41] is relevant.
The objects of the database contain the information related to
companies; a company dataset (CD) contains objects related to
a single company; a conflict of interest (COI) class contains the
datasets of companies in competition. For example, the bank
COI class contains three competitive companies (i.e., three
CDs). The read and write policies in Chinese wall policy are
defined as follows [41]:
Read policy: a subjects ∈ S can read an objecto ∈ O
provided that, either there is an objecto′ ∈ O such thats has
accessedo′ and CD(o′) = CD(o), or for all objectso′,o′ ∈
PR(s) ⇒ COI(o′) , COI(o), wherePR(s) is the set of object
s has accessed previously.
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In other words, a subjects is permitted to read an objecto
provided that, eithers reads the objects all in the same CD,
or reads the objects in different COIs. In the same COI, the
subject cannot read objects in different CDs.
Write policy: a subjects ∈ S may write to an objecto ∈ O
provided thats is permitted to reado, and for all the objects
o′, s can reado′ ⇒ CD(o′) = CD(o).
In other words, a subjects is permitted to write an objecto
only whens can reado and other objects accessible bys are
in the same CD witho.
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Fig. 16. An example for Chinese wall policy.
The Bank COI class consists of three CDs, i.e., Bank of
America, HSBC Bank and Citibank (Figure 16). The data in
the same CD will be represented with the same color, and the
three CDs are specified with three different colorsa,b, andc,
respectively (Figure 17). Once there is a request, e.g., request
for an object in Bank of America, then a tokena is put into
the entry place and the EPNP model is initially marked. Since
requesting two different CD is not permitted, the entry place is
initially marked with only one token. For simplicity, we denote
the marking and weight in the EPNP with colors instead of
vectors. For example, in Figure 17, we usea to replace vector
(a,0,0) and usex, y andz to denote any one of the colors.
read write
x !z (resp., y!z)
x=z(resp., y=z)
z! z"
Fig. 17. The specification of one COI class of the Chinese
wall policy.
When the subject requests to read objects in some CD, the
transition read is considered. Placer is a record place: once
the subject had a request, the corresponding data will have
a record in this place. Since firing transitiont1 and t2 will
not consume the tokens in placer, it is possible to specified
record in this way. Suppose a subject had previously requested
some objects. Based on the Chinese Wall policy, if the new
request belongs to the same CD as before, the new request
is granted. In the EPNP specification, if all data recorded in
placer belong to the same color, i.e.,∀z, x = z, transitiont1 is
firable and the output is “Accept”; otherwise,∃z, x , z, then
transitiont2 is firable and the output is “Reject”.
When the subject requests to write objects in some CD,
the transitionwrite is considered and the request data is
recorded in placer. Based on the Chinese Wall policy, once
the new writing-requested object is in a different CD from
previous requests, the request will be rejected. In the EPNP
specification, if∃z , y, transitiont2 is firable and the output
is “Reject”; otherwise,∀z, y = z, transitiont1 is firable and the
output is “Accept”.
7.2 Composition of sub-policies
For handling a local document (including the common docu-
mentsD), both local policy and global policy contains some
sub-policies, that are Chinese Wall policy (CWP), printer
accessing policy (PAP) and writing accessing policy (WAP).
Based on the information flow, the global EPNP specification
is shown in Figure 18. The sub-policies are combined by
applying Enable and Choice operators based on the global
policy requirement.
CWP
pe= p1e
p1x
PAP
p2e
WAP
p3e
p2x p3x
pX
tread twrite
fread fwrite
Fig. 18. Abstracted specification of the policy (for both local
and global use).
7.3 Local policy specification and verification
The detailed EPNP specification of the local policy is shown
in Figure 19. Let us explain it.
For a local request, the EPNP-based specification of CWP
for one COI is presented in Section 7.1.
In case of a reading request, transitiontread is fired and,
provided the decision of CWP was “(read, accept)”, the user
can request copying the document (firing transitiont71), or
printing the document (firing transitiont51), or printing and
copying (firing transitiont11). Once there exists an available
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xeroxing machine (i.e. whenr2 is marked), the user can copy.
After copying, transitiont81 is fired and the xeroxing machine
is released; once there exists an available printer ((i.e. when
r1 is marked), the user can print. After printing, transitiont61
is fired and the printer is released; once there exist available
printers and xeroxing machines, the user can print and copy;
then transitionst31 and t41 are fired and both resources are
released. If the decision of CWP was “(read, reject)”, transition
t91 is fired. The final transitionfread just outputs “OK” ,
meaning that the request has been handled.
In case of a writing request, transitiontwrite is fired and,
provided the decision of CWP was “(write, accept)”, the user
can write the document. When the document is available (i.e.
when placer3 is marked),t13 is firable and the user can process
writing the document (t23 corresponds to the operation of
writing); after writing, the document is released and updated
(t33 is fired). If the decision of CWP was “(write, reject)”,
transition t93 is fired. The final transitionfwrite just outputs
“OK” , meaning that the request has been handled.
read write
x z (resp., y z)x=z(resp., y=z)
p1x
pe= p1e
p2e
p3et11
t21
p11
t31
p21
p2x
p31
t41
r1
r2
t51
p41
t61
t71
t81
p51
t91
t13
t23
p13
p23
p3x
r3
pX
fread fwrite
tread twrite
t33
read write
t93
z z
Fig. 19. EPNP specification of the local policy.
The local policy (Figure 19) consists of three sub-policies,
namely CWP, PAP, WAP which are combined by applying
Enable and Choice operators. Based on Propositions 5 and 6,
the abstract EPNP model shown in Figure 19 is correct, i.e.,
complete, terminating, consistent and confluent. It is easy to
verify that all three sub-policies are correct. At the same time,
both PAP and WAP terminate properly. Although CWP does
not terminate properly (placer is unbounded), the control flow
is similar to that of a properly terminating process. Hence, after
adding the three sub-policies to the abstract EPNP by applying
place refinement, the resulting local policy (Figure 19) is
correct (based on Proposition 11).
7.4 Global policy specification and verification
The global policy specification is given in Figure 20). Let us
explain how it is built, in comparison with the local policy
specification.
For CWP, in an interoperation domain, the policy has to deal
with multiple COIs. Hence, it differs from the local policy by
changing the conditions of firing transitionst1 and t2. Based
on Chinese Wall policy, for a new request “readingx ∈ (CD ∈
COIi)”, there are two cases for accepting the request: the first
is when all its recorded dataz belong to the same CD asx,
that is bothx and z have the same color (x = z); another
case is whenx belongs to a COI diffrent from its records, i.e.,
x ∈ COIi , z ∈ COI j . Otherwise, i.e.,∃z , x, x, z ∈ COIi , the
request is rejected. As for a request “writing y”, only when
all the records andx belong to the same CD, i.e.,∀z, y = z,
the request is accepted. Otherwise, i.e.,∃z y, the request is
rejected.
For PAP, the difference is sharing resourcesr1 andr2, which
can be specified by place fusion with complete occupying
resources.
For WAP, if the document does not belong toD, transition
t23 (resp.,t24) can be fired just as processing local documents.
If the document belongs toD, then the document should be
processed by two users from different domains. Hence, the
fused transitiont2 is fired and the document is processed by
two users together at the same time. Here transitiont2 repre-
sents the document processing, which is assigned with time
constraints. Transitiont43 (resp., t44) is used for specifying
bypass: when a local document is processed, the cooperating
domain can be bypassed directly by firing transitiont43 or t44.
The global policy (Figure 20) consists of five sub-policies,
namely one CWP with multiple COI records, two PAPs,
and two WAPs. The two PAPs are combined by applying
place fusion with complete occupying resources, and the two
WAPs are combined by applying transition fusion. Then, based
on the super-policy, i.e., the global EPNP (Figure 18), the
three (combined) sub-policies are added by applying place
refinement operator. It is easy to verify that each primitive
policy is correct. By Proposition 9, Proposition 10, the two
combined sub-policies PAP and WAP are both correct. At the
same time, both PAP and WAP terminate properly. Although
CWP does not terminate properly (placer is unbounded), the
control flow is similar to that of a properly terminating process.
Hence, after refining the global EPNP by applying place
refinement, the resulted global policy (Figure 20) is correct,
i.e., complete, terminating, consistent and confluent (based on
Proposition 11). Note that, in this example, the sub-policies
belong to different types. For instance, CWP will output a
decision, while PAP and WAP will not. PAP may result in
deadlock if resource competition exists, while WAP never
be in such a situation. Theoretically, once the user’s request
of “reading” or “writing” is permitted, the user succeeds in
copying, printing or writing for the document. However, in
o der to avoid deadlock, it is possible for a user to wait printers
and copy machines for a very long time if many new requests
keep on coming and occupying the resources.
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p2e
p2x
pX
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fwrite
tread
p2x2t2x
ttep2e1
t11
t21
p11
t31
p21
p2x1
p31
t41
r1
r2
t51
p41
t61
t71
t81
p51
p2e2
t12
t22
p12
t32
p22
p32
t42
t52
p42
t62
t72
t82
p52
t91 t92
read write
C2={x z , x, z COIi
(resp., y z)}
C1 = {x=z, or (x z, x COIi, z COIj)
(resp., y=z)}
p1x
pe= p1e
p3e
twrite
p3e1
t13
t2
p13
t33
p23
p3x1
r4
p3e2
t14
p14
t34
p24
p3x2
t3e
t3x
r3
t23 t24
read
write
p3x
t43 t44DyDyDx Dx
z z
Fig. 20. EPNP specification of the global policy.
8 C 
In an extended Petri net, time is assigned to transitions for
specifying the duration of executing operations, colors are
assigned to tokens and weights for distinguishing different
data, resources and the preconditions of executing operations.
Based on the newly defined concept of extended Petri net
process, this paper specifies security policies in a modular
way. Policy composition operators are specified and property
preserving results are stated for verification. This technology
is suitable for general security policy design, especially for
large and complex security systems. In a real-life software
system, the system requirements may be changeable, system
action is dynamic and the security policy is complex. Hence,
much more policy composition operators should be available
for the specification, and much more policy properties should
be defined and verified for satisfying the policy requirements.
In future work, the focus is on looking for new modeling
techniques, composition operators and formal definition and
verification of policy properties.
Because of the complexity and large-scale of real life
systems, the policy properties may not always be preserved
properly when applying PPPA. For example, consistency and
confluence properties cannot be preserved even by adding a
XACML combiner for the Disable operator. In order to design
a safe policy, we may try to design a new combiner for
composition in order to restore the policy properties for the
resultant policy. The combiner may not be based only on the
decisions of sub-policies, but possibly also on the activity of
the sub-policies. Designing new combiners for restoring the
unpreserved properties is another interesting future research
topic.
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